Separations, Sorting and Cyclical Unemployment * This paper establishes a new fact about the compositional changes in the pool of unemployed over the U.S. business cycle and evaluates a number of theories that can potentially explain it. Using micro-data from the Current Population Survey for the years 1962-2011, it documents that in recessions the pool of unemployed shifts towards workers with high wages in their previous job. Moreover, it shows that these changes in the composition of the unemployed are mainly due to the higher cyclicality of separations for high-wage workers, and not driven by differences in the cyclicality of job-finding rates. A search-matching model with endogenous separations and worker heterogeneity in terms of ability has difficulty in explaining these patterns, but an extension of the model with creditconstraint shocks does much better in accounting for the new facts.
Introduction 2 Data
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on U.S. micro data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1962-2011. The CPS is the main labor force survey for the U.S., representative of the population aged 15 and older. It has a rotating panel structure, where households are surveyed in four consecutive months, rotated out of the panel for eight months, and then surveyed again for another four consecutive months, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Note that the CPS records the labor-force status for each person in the sample each month. Weekly hours and earnings, however, are collected only in the fourth and eighth interview of the survey, referred to as the Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG). The empirical analysis proceeds with two di¤erent data sources: First, I use data from the CPS ORG and monthly …les to estimate monthly transition probabilities from employment to unemployment and vice versa for the period 1979-2008. Second, to extend the analysis to the period before 1979, I use data from the CPS March supplement for the period 1962-2011. The march supplement collects data on wage income from the last year for those currently unemployed, and can be used to replicate the main statistic of the compositional changes in the pool of unemployed, but it does not allow for an analysis of monthly transition probabilities as it is collected only once per year.
Sample Criteria and Measurement
CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) and monthly data The main focus of the empirical analysis is on the wage of those who lose their job and become unemployed. Wage data is available only for the fourth and the eighth interview of each household. I restrict my sample to all individuals with available wage data from the fourth interview and analyze the employment outcomes in subsequent months. I do not use wage data from the eighth interview as this is the …nal interview in the CPS panel and I want to avoid possible selection e¤ects associated with including wages after job loss. 2 I restrict my sample to individuals aged 19 to 64 who worked in the private sector, are not self-employed and not self-incorporated. I also trim the sample for outliers excluding individuals with a wage above the 99.75th or below the 0.25th percentile each year and individuals with weekly hours below 5 or above 80. The total sample size is 1,308,385 individuals, where each individual has up to three monthly transitions between labor market states (between interviews 5 to 6, 6 to 7 and 7 to 8). Out of these 1,308,385 individuals, 84,193 experienced at least one month of unemployment in interview months 5-8.
The CPS does not follow individuals who move out from an address surveyed in a previous month. 3 This gives rise to substantial attrition between the fourth interview when individuals report their wage and the interviews 9, 10, 11 and 12 months later (as shown by Figure 1 , there is a gap of 8 months between the 4th and the 5th interview): 27.8% of the individuals in my sample had no match in interviews 5-8. Similarly to Bleakly, Ferris and Fuhrer (1999), I adjust the survey weights to account for attrition. More precisely, I run a logit regression of the likelihood of remaining in the sample for interviews 5 to 8 on observable characteristics (such as sex, age, education, race and marital status) for each year, and multiply the existing survey weight with the inverse of the predicted value of the logit regression. This de ‡ates the weight for groups and years with low attrition rates. 4 The selected sample excludes unemployed individuals who have been unemployed for more than 12 months. This may lead to biases in the estimates of the average and the cyclicality of job …ndings rates. Notice, however, that the median duration of unemployment was less than three months for the entire sample period according to o¢ cial statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the fraction of those with unemployment durations above one year averaged only 8.8% over the sample period with a maximum of 13.3% in 1983. 5 This suggests that the constraint imposed by the sample-selection criterion is relatively minor. I do not extend my analysis to the most recent period because the share of long-term unemployed increased dramatically in the recent recession.
Finally, the sample does not include those who were classi…ed as out of the labor force at the time of their 4th CPS interview. For this reason, movements from out of the labor force into unemployement are not included in my sample.
aggregate unemployment rate (the correlation coe¢ cient is 0.55). 7;8 Panel (a) in Figure 3 shows very similar patterns for the cyclicality of the average wage on previous job, using the CPS March sample over the period 1962-2011. The table further shows that the patterns appear in every single recession since 1962, and the magnitude of the changes is very similar across the two data sources. 9 One might be concerned about wage compression and argue that the wage di¤erential between those who lose their job and those who remain employed narrows in a recession, simply because overall wage dispersion becomes smaller at the same time. To evaluate this possibility, I attribute an ordinal wage rank to each individual in my data set (the rank in the wage distribution in a given year is de…ned by lining up all individuals according to their current wage from the lowest to the highest on the unit interval). If wage compression drives the patterns in Panel (a) of Figures 2 and 3, then the average wage rank should show no correlation with the aggregate unemployment rate. However, Panel (b) in the same …gures show a very strong correlation of the average wage rank of the unemployed with the aggregate unemployment rate. The correlation coe¢ cient is 0.72 (CPS March data: 0.74), suggesting that wage compression plays no role. In terms of the magnitude, a percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate is, on average, associated with a 1.5 percentage-point increase (CPS March data: 1.2 percentage-point increase) in the average wage rank of the job losers, which represents a substantial shift in the composition of the pool of unemployed.
Panel (c) in Figures 2 and 3 shows the same plot but for the residual of a Mincerstyle regression of the log wage on observable characteristics such as potential experience, educational attainment, gender, marital status, and race, and dummies for state, industry, occupation and year. 10 The average wage residual is still strongly counter-cyclical for those who lost their job in the previous year, with a correlation with the unemployment rate of 0.58. The magnitude is smaller as a percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 0.90% increase (CPS March data: 0.84%) in the average residual wage of the unemployed, as compared to a 2.76% increase (CPS March data: 2.88%) in the average raw wage in Panel (a). This suggests that both observed and unobserved factors contribute to the compositional changes in the unemployment pool over the business cycle.
To get a better sense of what observable factors drive the compositional changes in the unemployment pool, I regress the detrended series of each component of the predicted wage 7 The unemployment rate is taken from the o¢ cial tables of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 8 One might also note that the compositional changes seem to be slightly leading the unemployment rate. The reason is that -as documented further below -the changes in the pool are driven by the di¤erential cyclicality in job separations, which tend to lead the unemployment rate. 9 The correlation coe¢ cient of the two series over the period 1980-2008 is 0.84. 10 By de…nition, the average wage residual is zero for each year for the full sample and close to zero for the employed as they represent over 90 % of the full sample. 
Raw wage

Predicted wage Residual wage
Notes: Newey-West corrected standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; (i) For the predicted and residual wage, the years 1962-67 were not included as no information was available on industry in previous year. All series are yearly averages, HPfiltered with a smoothing parameter of 100. T he cylicality is measured as the coefficient β in the regression log(xt) = α+βlog(Ut)+εt, where xt is the average wage from the previous year for those unemployed at time t and Ut is the official unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistic. Note that the coefficients on the predicted and residual wage do not add up exactly to the coefficient on the raw wage because of HP-filtering. Source: T he author's estimates with data from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group files for the years 1979-2008 and the CPS March files for the years 1962-2011.
for those currently unemployed on the detrended aggregate unemployment rate (note that the coe¢ cients on the predicted and residual wage do not add up exactly to the coe¢ cient on the raw wage because of detrending). The results in Table 1 show that, compared to periods of low unemployment, the unemployed in recessions are more experienced, more educated, more likely to be male, more likely to be married, more likely to be white, and more likely to come from industries and occupations that pay high wages. Some of these patterns might be well-known, such as the cyclical changes in the composition of unemployed by gender or industry, but it is striking that all observable components contribute to the changes in the pool of unemployed in the same direction. In terms of the magnitude, the predicted wage from industry and occupation dummies contributes about one third to the total of the compositional changes, whereas the predicted wage of the demographic determinants of the wage and the residual contribute the remaining two thirds. The results are suprisingly similar between the estimates from the CPS ORG …les and the CPS March data. This demonstrates that attrition is not causing any major bias in my estimates with the CPS ORG data, as the CPS March data contains backward looking information on wages in the previous year and thus does not rely on matching individuals across survey waves. I also use o¢ cial data from the BLS on the number of unemployed by educational attainment, which is available since 1992. This is an important robustness check as it does not exclude the long-term unemployed nor does it exclude those moving into unemployment from out of the labor force. I compute a predicted wage value on educational attainment by computing the share of each group among the unemployed (less than high school, high school degree, some college and college degree) and multiply the share of each group with the estimated coe¢ cient on the dummy for each group in the wage regression. The coe¢ cient in the bivariate regression of the predicted value on educational attainment on the detrended aggregate unemployment rate is 0.24 (with a standard error of 0.09), which is a little bit higher than the estimates on the predicted value by educational attainment in Table 1 , but within the con…dence interval. The compositional changes by educational attainment might come as a surprise to some, as the unemployment rate tends to be much more volatile for the low skilled. However, as demonstrated further below, it is the volatility of the log of the unemployment rate, and not the volatility of the level, that matters for the compositional changes in the pool of unemployed.
One thing to keep in mind is that the reported series are HP-…ltered such that the mean is zero for both the employed and unemployed over the entire sample period. The mean of the un…ltered series is, however, considerably lower for those who lose their job, as opposed to those who remain employed. This suggests that the unemployed are on average of lower quality, but become more similar to the employed in a recession. To make this point clearer, Panel (a) of Figure 4 shows the densities of the unemployed by percentile of the distribution wages in the previous year. It shows that, in periods of low unemployment, the pool of unemployed is strongly skewed towards the lower part of the distribution of wages, whereas this is much less true in periods of high unemployment. Interestingly, even the share of individuals in the top quartile increases in periods of high unemployment. In fact, in periods of high unemployment, the density looks almost like a uniform density, which suggests that the unemployed in recessions are similar to the average employed person.
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The same patterns hold true when looking at the distribution of residual wages (see Panel (b)).
The Cyclicality of Separations and Job Findings by Wage Group
Changes in the composition of the pool of unemployed over the business cycle can arise because of di¤erent behavior of in ‡ows into unemployment and/or the di¤erent behavior of out ‡ows from unemployment across wage groups. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4 show the same patterns for the newly unemployed (i.e., those unemployed for less than one month) as for the pool of unemployed as a whole. The densities look very similar to those in Panels (a) and (b), which suggests that the documented patterns above are driven mainly by the ‡ows into unemployment. To analyse this in more detail, I look at the worker ‡ow data from the CPS ORG sample to determine whether the patterns documented in the previous section are due to job separations or job …ndings. In particular, I divide the sample in each year into those below and above the median wage and analyze the cyclical behavior of the separation Years of hig h unemployment = 1982, 1983, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2002, 2003 . Years of low unemployment = 1987, 1988, 1989, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2006, 2007. Years of low unem ploym ent Years of high unem ploym ent and job-…nding rate for each of these groups. Job separations and …ndings are de…ned as the percentage of those who changed their employment status (from E (employment) to U (unemployment) or from U to E). The groups are divided into below or above the median wage in interview 4 each year, and the transitions are analyzed for subsequent interviews (i.e., monthly transitions between interviews 5 to 6, 6 to 7 and 7 to 8).
Measurement
Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009) show that one can decompose the contributions of separations (s) and job …ndings (f ) to changes in the unemployment rate approximately into
where
is the ‡ow steady state unemployment rate. Now, the share of group i in the pool of unemployed is de…ned as
where U it is the unemployment rate of group i at time t and i is the population share for group i (assumed to be constant). Given equations (1) and (2), it can be shown that changes in the share of group i in the pool of unemployed can be decomposed into
which implies that changes in the share of group i are related to changes in the log of the separation and job-…nding rate of group i relative to the average. More importantly, since
is very similar across groups, one can directly conclude from the magnitude of the changes in the log separation and job-…nding rates which margins are more important for the changes in the composition of the pool. To understand how separations and job …ndings relate to cyclical changes in the unemployment rate, one thus has to relate the changes in the log of the separation and job-…nding rate to the aggregate unemployment rate (or other cyclical indicators). For this reason, I run the following regressions:
where x it stands for s it (separation rate), f it (job-…nding rate) or U it (unemployment rate) for group i at time t and the measure of cyclicality is the percent increase in x it in response to a 1% increase in the aggregate unemployment rate (the coe¢ cient x i ). All series are monthly, seasonally adjusted, and detrended with an HP-…lter with smoothing parameter 900,000. 12 Results Table 2 summarizes the main results for di¤erent groups in terms of the average as well as the cyclicality of separation and job-…nding rates. The …rst two columns split the sample into those below and above the median wage. Columns 3 and 4 report the results for those below and above the median residual wage.
Not surprisingly, separations are on average lower for high-wage workers than for lowwage workers. The main new result, however, is that the cyclicality of separations is almost twice as large for individuals with high wages compared to those below the median. 13 is 0.63 compared to 0.54 for the cyclicality with the raw wage measure.
Job-…nding rates are of similar size, on average, for both groups, and also their cyclicality is very similar across groups: The cyclicality of job …ndings is slightly more cyclical for those above the median wage, but the pattern reverses for the residuals and the di¤erences are not statistically signi…cant. Overall, I conclude that changes in the composition of the pool in terms of the previous wage are driven: Finally, I use Fujita and Ramey's (2009) adjustment for time aggregation bias and …nd that the di¤erences in the cyclicality of separations are even stronger for those below and above the median wage. Table A.4 also shows the baseline results but splitting the quartiles of the wage distribution each year instead of below and above the median. The results are very similar and show that separations are most cyclical in the top quartile of the distribution of the hourly wages, suggesting that the proportion of unemployed workers coming from the top quartile increases in a recession. 14 
Job-to-Job Transitions and Discouragement
The measure of job separation above does not include job-to-job transitions (in other words, job separations that do not result in an intervening spell of unemployment), and thus one possible explanation for the patterns documented above could be that during good times high-wage workers transition directly from job to job, but during bad times they have to go through a spell of unemployment to …nd new employment. The original CPS did not ask respondents about job switches, but fortunately with the redesign of the CPS in 1994, it became possible to identify those who switched jobs between two monthly interviews (see Fallick and Fleischman, 2004 , for details). Table 3 shows the average and the cyclicality of job-to-job transitions for the same groups as in Table 2 . As in Fallick and Fleischman, the monthly job-to-job transitions are about twice as large as the ‡ow from E to U. The jobto-job transitions are procyclical, but less so for individuals with high wages. In particular, the cyclicality for those with high residual wages is -0.06, compared to -0.23 for those with low residual wages. This evidence does not support the view that the high cyclicality of separations for high-wage workers is driven by the fact that direct job-to-job transitions decrease strongly during recessions for this group. On the contrary, it appears that job-tojob transitions decrease more for low-wage workers in recessions and thus one would expect separations into unemployment to be more cyclical for the low-wage group. In other words, on-the-job search by high-wage individuals is unlikely to explain the cyclical patterns in the pool of unemployed.
Another possible explanation of the shifts in the pool of unemployed workers towards high-wage workers could be related to worker discouragement. If low-wage workers get discouraged faster in recessions and leave the pool of unemployed towards out of the labor force, then the pool of unemployed should shift towards high-wage workers. Table 3 shows the average as well as the cyclicality of transitions from unemployed (U) to out of the labor force (OLF). On average, low-wage workers tend to leave unemployment more frequently 14 When looking at the cyclicality of separations in the distribution of the residual wages in Panel B of Table A .4, the cyclicality of separation is highest in the third quartile. However, the cyclicality of separations in the top quartile is still considerably higher than in the …rst and second quartile. Transitions from U to OLF towards OLF. However, the cyclicality between the two groups is almost identical, which suggests that transitions between U and OLF cannot account for compositional changes in the pool of unemployed documented above. In summary, the data strongly suggests that the unemployment pool shifts towards highwage individuals in recessions, and this shift is mainly due to job separations.
Relation to Previous Research
Bils, Chang and Kim (2012) …nd similar patterns in the data for low-wage vs. high-wage workers from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the years 1983-2003, but they focus their attention on the cyclical nature of employment for these groups and pay little attention to the question of cyclical changes in the composition of the pool of unemployed. More precisely, they split their sample into four groups -by low or high hours and by low or high wages -and report the cyclicality of separations, hirings, employment and hours worked. Averaging the cyclicality of separations for the wage groups, one …nds that the ratio of the cyclicality of separations between the low-and high-wage group is about 0.55, similar to my estimates in the CPS data. Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) show that there is a substantial composition bias when looking at the cyclicality of aggregate real wages. The employed become more skilled during recessions, leading the researcher to underestimate the cyclicality of real wages when looking at aggregate wage data. This evidence seems to be in contrast with the facts presented above, because it suggests that the proportion of high-wage workers among the employed increases in recessions. However, their evidence relies on the composition bias in the aggregate hourly wage, which is a weighted average by hours. Therefore, the composition bias could be driven either by a higher cyclicality of hours for the low skilled (the intensive margin) or a higher cyclicality of employment for the low skilled (the extensive margin). In fact, Hines, Hoynes and Krueger (2001) show that Solon, Barsky and Parker's results rely on the weighting of aggregate real wages by hours worked. They demonstrate that with unweighted wage data, composition bias has almost no e¤ect on the cyclicality of real wages, suggesting that it is not the composition of the employed that changes over the business cycle but rather the hours worked by di¤erent skill groups.
Another important observation is that the pool of unemployed and the pool of employed do not necessarily have to shift in the same direction if the pools di¤er in the average quality. Speci…cally, since the typical unemployed is of lower ability than the typical employed, a transition of a worker from the lower part of the distribution of the pool of employed to the upper part of the distribution of the pool of unemployed can make both pools better o¤. More formally, one can approximate the relationship between changes in the share of group i in the pool of unemployed (d U it ) and changes in the share of group i in the pool of employed (d E it ) as follows 15 :
which implies that if the shares of the two groups are the same ( U it = 0:5), then the pools must sort in opposite directions. However, in reality the share of high-wage workers among the unemployed is higher ( U high;t = 0:39 in the CPS sample) and thus shifts do not necessarily go in the opposite direction. Moreover, changes in the group share among the unemployed lead to much smaller changes in the group share among the employed, because the group of unemployed is so much smaller compared to the group of employed. In fact, one can compute the response of the share of the high-wage types from the estimates in Table 2 , and then use the formula in equation (5) to compute the implied change in the share in the pool of employed. The results are as follows:
which says that the share of the high-wage types amongh the unemployed increases by more than three percentage points in response to a one percentage-point increase in the aggregate unemployment rate. These results also imply that the pool of employed shifts in the same direction, but the shift is much smaller in magnitude than for the pool of unemployed and close to zero: A percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate increases the share of the high-wage types by 0.012 percentage points. To conclude, the large shifts in recessions towards high-wage workers in the pool of unemployed documented above are consistent with small shifts towards high-wage workers in the pool of employed.
Model
In this and the following section, I evaluate a number of theories that can potentially explain the compositional shifts in the pool of unemployed over the U.S. business cycle. I start with an extension of the standard search-matching model 16 to worker heterogeneity and …nd that it has di¢ culties in replicating the facts summarized above. Then, I consider further extensions of this baseline model that can potentially account for the documented facts. In the baseline model, there are two types of workers (indexed by i) who di¤er in their market productivity a i and potentially other parameters. Similar to Bils, Chang and Kim (2012), I assume worker ability to be observable to the potential employer and thus …rms can direct their search to a particular worker type. 17 More precisely, there is a continuum of workers of each type and a continuum of …rms, which are matched according to the matching function:
The job …nding probability is
and the hiring rate
. Match productivity is de…ned as zxa i where z is aggregate productivity, x match-speci…c productivity and a i worker-speci…c productivity. Match-speci…c productivity is assumed to follow an AR(1) process as discussed below in the calibration strategy. I assume that all matches start at the median match productivity x.
Let us proceed to describe the value functions of workers and …rms. The value function of an unemployed worker of type i is:
where aggregate productivity z is the aggregate state. The value of being unemployed depends on the unemployment bene…t, b i , which potentially depends on worker type, and the discounted value of remaining unemployed in the next period or having a job with the value W i (z 0 ; x). 16 The main reference is Pissarides (2000) . I deviate from his model by allowing match-speci…c productivity shocks to be correlated across time. 17 Model Appendix C1 discusses a model where worker ability is unobservable by the employer and thus search on the …rm is non-directed. The results of the model with non-directed search are similar to those of the model with directed search; in particular, the assumption of non-directed search has little impact on the cyclicality of separations for di¤erent ability groups.
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The value function of an employed worker is:
which depends on the utility from the current wage and the discounted future expected value. Whenever the value of the job W i is lower than the value of being unemployed U i , the worker will separate and thus receive the value U i (z 0 ) in the next period.
The value of posting a vacancy for a …rm is:
which depends on the vacancy posting cost c i and the discounted future expected value. Note that q( i ) is the …rm's hiring rate, the rate at which it …lls a posted vacancy. The value of a …lled vacancy is:
which depends on the cash ‡ow (productivity minus the wage) and the discounted future expected value. Note that the …rm will …re the worker whenever the value of the …lled vacancy is lower than the value of posting a vacancy. Wages are determined by standard Nash-bargaining and split the joint surplus from the employment relationship according to the Nash-bargaining solution:
where is the bargaining share of the worker. Firm-worker matches are dissolved whenever the joint surplus from the relationship
) is smaller than zero, which implies that the reservation match productivity R i (z), i.e., the level of match-speci…c productivity x below which the employment relationship is dissolved, satis…es:
I refer to (12) as the e¢ cient-separation condition. Separations are always in the interest of both parties and never unilateral (thus e¢ cient).
A directed search equilibrium is de…ned as the reservation match productivity R i (z), the wage schedules w i (z; x), the labor market tightness i (z) and the value functions U i (z), W i (z; x), V i (z) and J i (z; x) that satisfy: 1. the Nash-bargaining solution (11), 2. the e¢ cient-separation condition (12), 3. the zero-pro…t condition: V i (z) = 0 and 4. the value functions (7), (8) , (9) and (10).
Calibration
The main parameters of the model are calibrated to standard values in the literature. The following tabulation summarizes the calibration strategy. The parameters are chosen to be the same for both groups of workers unless otherwise noted. The vacancy posting cost c i is calibrated internally to match a monthly job-…nding rate of 0.3 for both groups (as in the CPS data). The elasticity of the matching function is in accordance with estimates from micro studies and is set to 0.5. The matching e¢ ciency is a free parameter in the model and chosen such that = 1 in steady state. The worker's bargaining power is set equal to the elasticity of the matching function in order to satisfy the Hosios condition. The log of match productivity is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with the autocorrelation coe¢ cient 0.98. The standard deviation of match productivity shocks is set to match an average monthly separation rate of 0.01, as in the CPS data. I discretize the state space in terms of match productivities x with Tauchen's (1986) algorithm. Aggregate productivity z is assumed to take on two values, set to match a standard deviation of aggregate labor productivity of 0.02, as reported by Shimer (2005) . The productivitiy parameters a low and a high are assumed to be 0.8 and 1.2. In the CPS data the ratio of the wage of the group below and above the median wage is around 0.4. Thus, the assumption of a high =a low = 1:2=0:8 is a conservative estimate of di¤erences in worker productivites. The unemployment bene…t is assumed to be constant and equal to 0.6 (somewhere in between the extreme assumptions of Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) ). The assumption of a constant bene…t by worker type implies that, at the median match productivity x = 1, the ratio of bene…ts over worker productivity is 0.75 for the low types and 0.5 for the high types. This strategy is motived by two main observations: First, wages are generally replaced only up to a speci…ed limit. In the U.S., the maximum unemployment bene…t is binding for approximately 35% of the unemployed workers (see Krueger and Meyer, 2002) . Second, the parameter b should also capture the utility derived from additional leisure during unemployment as well as consumption provided by additional home production, which is likely to be less than perfectly correlated with market ability, a. For these reasons, the replacement rates should be higher for the low-ability group. Table 4 reports results for the baseline calibration. The same …ltering methods as for the empirical results from the CPS are applied to the simulated time series. Evidently, the model generates higher average separation rates for low-ability workers. However, the model does not do well in capturing the cyclicality of separations as it generates a higher, not lower, cyclicality of separations for the low-ability types.
Results
The reason for this failure is related to the cyclical behavior of the worker's outside option. The e¢ cient-separation equation (12) , rewritten for convenience, is
where the left-hand side is the value of the match and the right-hand side is the value of the outside option. When aggregate labor productivity increases, the value of the match increases proportionally, whereas the value of being unemployed increases by less than onefor-one because b is constant over the business cycle. Therefore, staying employed becomes more attractive as aggregate productivity increases and thus R i decreases. For workers with low ability, the outside option ‡uctuates less as the constant term of U i (the unemployment bene…t b) is large relative to the non-constant term (the expected value in the next period) Notes: T he series are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 900,000 and the cylicality is measured as in the CPS ORG data (see notes in T able 2 for details). Sample size: 1200 monthly observations where each observation is estimated from a cross-section of 100,000 workers.
and thus R i changes more in response to an aggregate productivity shock. For this reason, separations are more cyclical for low-ability workers. Table 4 also shows the results for an alternative calibration strategy where I assume that the unemployment bene…t is proportional to worker ability (b i = ba i ) and the variance of match productivity is higher for low-ability workers 18 . More precisely, I assume that " is twice as large for the low-ability group ( = 0:04). In line with the data, this model generates higher average separation rates for low-ability workers. More importantly, this model also generates a higher cyclicality of separation rates for high-ability workers. The reason is that the density of matches with x = R i is higher for the low-variance (high-ability) group, and thus, changes in the reservation match productivity translate into larger changes in the separation rate. 19 This second calibration strategy generates both lower separations and a higher cyclicality of separations for the high-wage group. However, it is unclear why the variance of matchspeci…c productivity shocks should be higher for low-ability workers. One way of evaluating whether high-wage workers have a lower variance of match productivity shocks is to look at the yearly wage changes between the two outgoing rotation groups of the CPS (in interviews 4 18 This is essentially the calibration strategy used by Bils, Chang and Kim (2012). More precisely, they choose the variance of match-speci…c productivities to match the average separation rate for each group. 19 Formally, it can be shown that the change in the separation rate in response to aggregate productivity shocks is
where fi(Ri)
Fi(Ri) is the inverse Mills ratio for the empirical distribution of match productivity. Note that for many distributions and, in particular, for the (log) normal distribution, the inverse Mill ratio is fi(Ri) Fi(Ri) is decreasing in the variance of match productivities. Therefore, for a given dRi dz , the cyclicality of the separation rate is decreasing in the variance of match productivities. 
Further, assuming that the distributions of match productivity shocks and aggregate shocks are constant over time and independent of each other, we get:
where x and z are the autocorrelations of match-speci…c and aggregate productivity shocks. If the variance of match productivity shocks di¤ers across wage groups, we should observe di¤erences in the variance of wage changes. However, in the CPS data, the variance of wage changes is similar across the two wage groups. Table 5 shows that the standard deviation of the yearly wage growth rate is almost the same across the two wage groups (and higher for those with some college education or more). To sum up, there seems to be little justi…cation for assuming a higher variance of match productivity shocks for the low-ability group.
Wage Rigidity
How about other prospective explanations for the di¤erent cyclicality of separations of low and high-wage workers? 20 One possible explanation is that wage rigidity leads to more cyclical separations for high-wage workers as the failure of adjusting the wage in response to an aggregate shock results in the …rm …ring the worker. The rigid-wage hypothesis, however, faces several di¢ culties in explaining the pattern in the CPS data. First, the wage observations in the CPS sample are 9-12 months prior to the the observed separation. Gottschalk (2005) shows that wages are usually renegotiated one year after the last change, which implies that for most records in my sample wages were renegotiated between interview 4 and the subsequent interviews 9-12 months later. Naturally, it is possible that wages are renegotiated but still display substantial rigidity if the renegotiation only results in a small wage adjustment. Second, and more importantly, wage rigidity does not necessarily lead to more cyclical separations for high-wage workers. In particular, if the contribution of match-speci…c productivity shocks x to the variance of total match productivity zxa i is large, it is very di¢ cult to generate a model where wage rigidity leads to more cyclical separations for highwage workers. If wages fail to adjust in response to match-speci…c productivity shocks, then high-wage workers should also be more likely to be …red in good times. In the data, aggregate shocks to labor productivtiy are rather small and, in particular, small compared to matchspeci…c shocks. In my baseline calibration above, the standard deviation of match-speci…c shocks is 7.5 times higher than the standard deviation of aggregate shocks. Match-speci…c shocks are not observed but inferred from wage data, and reducing the standard deviation of match-speci…c productivity shocks would be at odds with data on cross-sectional wage dispersion.
Finally, sticky wages a¤ect separations because wages fail to adjust when they fall outside the bargaining set (the range within which the surplus for both parties is positive). This implies that separations may occur even if the joint surplus is positive: when wages are too high, the …rm …res the worker, whereas when wages are too low the worker quits. In both cases, however, the parties would be better o¤ by renegotiating the wage and thus these separations are bilaterally ine¢ cient. Another possibility would be to let wages adjust to the boundary of the bargaining set whenever they are about to leave it. In such a model, however, wage rigidity has little impact on separations as this type of wage rigidity a¤ects how the suprlus is split, but only has a limited impact on the total surplus. 21 As long as separations occur only when the total surplus is negative -i.e., as long as separations are e¢ cient -the model is similar to a model with ‡exible wages and thus unlikely to explain the empirical patterns of separations I have documented in the CPS data. Notes: T he series are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 900,000 and the cylicality is measured as in the CPS ORG data (see notes in T able 2 for details). Sample size: 1200 monthly observations where each observation is estimated from a cross-section of 100,000 workers. Table 6 . Model with firm death shocks: The cyclicality of separation and job-finding rates λ shock only λ and productivity shocks
Firm and Plant Death
Another reason why separations are more cylical for workers with high ability could be that separations in recessions are driven by the death of …rms and plants. In fact, there is ample evidence that …rm and plant death is countercylical (see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996; Figura, 2006) . If workers of di¤erent ability are randomly distributed across …rms, then plant death will increase separations for workers of all types by the same absolute number, and more in percentage terms for those with low average separation rates (high-ability workers). A simple way of modeling such shocks is to introduce an exogenous …rm death shock. In the benchmark model with one employee per …rm, this is equivalent to an exogenous separation shock. Figura (2006) shows that the yearly plant death rate increased from bottom to peak by approximately 5 percentage points in the 1981/1982 recession and by 7 percentage points in the 1991 recession. The average of these two recessions corresponds to an increase in the monthly death rate of approximately 0.5 percentage points. For this reason, I extend my benchmark model from above by assuming that …rms are hit by a death shock ( ) with a 0.5% probability per month in recessions and with zero probability in booms. As expected, Table  6 shows that separations in this model are more cyclical but on average lower for high-ability workers, as in the CPS data. However, the models fails in fully accounting for the di¤erences in the cyclicality of separations between low-and high-ability workers. With …rm and plant death shocks, di¤erences in the cyclicality of separations only come from di¤erences in the average separation rates. More precisely, it can be shown that in the presence of such shocks alone, the ratio of the cyclicality of separation rates is
, where s i denotes the average separation rate of group i. The ratio of the average separation rates between lowand high-wage workers in the CPS is 0.61, whereas the ratio of the cylicality of separation rates in the CPS is 0.54. In other words, a model with only …rm and plant death shocks cannot fully explain the di¤erences in cyclicality of separations in the CPS. As explained above, productivity shocks tend to shift separations in the opposite direction and thus, they make it even more di¢ cult to fully match the di¤erences found in the data.
Credit-Constraint Shocks
Recessions are often periods where access to credit becomes more di¢ cult. 22 Because of a shortfall of productivity in the short term, …rms might therefore be forced to close down projects that would be pro…table in the long term. How does such a credit-tightening a¤ect job separations? And, in particular, does it a¤ect matches with workers of low and high ability in a di¤erent way? To more formally evaluate these questions, I incorporate credit-constraint shocks into my benchmark model. I use a short-cut by assuming that in recessions, worker-…rm matches face a constraint to produce cash ‡ows above some negative number (z):
Naturally, workers may be willing to deviate from the Nash bargained wage and take a wage cut in order to continue the relationship. For this reason, wages are assumed to satisfy the Nash-bargaining solution w
N B i
(z; x) as long as the cash- ‡ow constraint (13) can be met, but otherwise adjust to meet the constraint:
If the cash- ‡ow constraint cannot be met at any acceptable wage for the worker, worker…rm matches will dissolve. The separation condition now states that the worker and the …rm are willing to remain in the relationship if their share of the surplus is non-negative:
where R w i (z) is the worker reservation match productivity and R f i (z) is the …rm reservation 22 See, e.g., Lown and Morgan (2004) who provide evidence that banks strongly tighten commercial credit standards in recessions. Moreover, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) provide a theoretical rationale for cyclical variations in borrowing constraints. In their model, small aggregate shocks lead to tighter borrowing constraints through a price e¤ect on collaterals. These e¤ects on borrowing constraints can be large as a reduction in the price of the collateral can lead to a further decline in demand for these assets and thus to a further reduction in the value of the collateral. match productivity. By (15) and (16), the reservation match productivities di¤er between worker and …rm and separations may occur even if the joint surplus is positive. 23 Actually, …rms never unilaterally …re a worker since cash- ‡ow constraints only impose an upper limit on the wage but not a lower limit (i.e. R w i (z) R f i (z)). If workers are willing to take wage cuts to continue the relationship, one may wonder whether cash- ‡ow constraints will ever result in separations. It should be kept in mind, however, that workers are willing to take wage cuts only as long as their share of the surplus remains positive. At the e¢ cient-separation level of match productivity R i (z), for example, workers are not willing to take any wage cut because their surplus from the match is zero. Therefore, a binding cash- ‡ow constraint will always lead to the separation for the matches whose productivity is at, or below, the e¢ cient-separation level of match productivity R i (z). 24 For worker-…rm matches with x > R i (z), there is some room for wage adjustment. However, the actual wage cut that the worker may be willing to take is small, because the surplus for those x close to R i (z) is small. The value functions in this model extension are the same as in the baseline model, except for the value function of the …lled vacancy:
where w i (z 0 ; x 0 ) takes a value of 1 if the worker stays with the …rm and 0 if the worker quits. 25 
Results
I use the same calibration as in the baseline model of Section 3. The only parameter left to calibrate is (z). Table 7 shows the simulation results for three di¤erent values of (z). I assume it to be 100%, 250% or 400% of the average cash ‡ow in the unconstrained economy (these values correspond to (z) = 0:02, (z) = 0:05 and (z) = 0:08, respectively). The average cash ‡ow in this economy is about 2.0% of average labor productivity. This is similar to other models; e.g., the cash ‡ow in the model of Shimer (2005) is, on average, 23 The assumption here is that wages are renegotiated in every period. In fact, if the …rm could commit to pay higher wages in the future when the constraint is no longer binding, the worker-…rm match could always be sustained if the total current surplus is positive. However, it is questionnable whether such commitment devices exist, especially because it requires a state contingent path for future wages. 24 See Model Appendix C2 for a formal proof of this statement. 25 A directed search equilibrium is de…ned as R w i (z), R f i (z), w i (z; x), i (z) and the value functions U i (z),W i (z; x),V i (z) and J i (z; x) that satisfy: 1. the Nash-bargaining solution subject to the cash- ‡ow constraint (13), 2. the separation equations (15) and (16), 3 . the zero-pro…t condition: V i (z) = 0 and 4. the value functions (7), (8), (9) Table 7 . Model with credit-constraint shocks: The cyclicality of separation and job-finding rates γ = -0.02 γ = -0.05 γ = -0.08
Notes: T he series are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 900,000 and the cylicality is measured as in the CPS ORG data (see notes in T able 2 for details). Sample size: 1200 monthly observations where each observation is estimated from a cross-section of 100,000 workers. around 1.5% of average labor productivity. It may be argued that these constraints are very tight as a …rm would need just one to four months of average productivity (depending on the calibration of ) to repay current losses. Note, however, that in this model, match productivity shocks are highly correlated across time and thus, the chances of recovering current losses are far smaller than that. All my calibrations yield more cyclical separations for high-ability workers. The calibration with the tightest constraint ( (z) = 0:02), however, seems unrealistic as it leads to aggregate separations that are far too cyclical relative to aggregate job …ndings. The reason is that the constraint is relatively tight, which makes aggregate separations very volatile. The calibrations where (z) = 0:05 and (z) = 0:08 do better in that respect and, at the same time, produce more cyclical separations for high-ability workers. Quantitatively, the model even overpredicts the cyclicality for high-ability workers when (z) = 0:05, whereas it almost exactly matches the ratio of the cyclicality of separations of low-and high-ability workers in the CPS data when (z) = 0:08. It is important to point out that the relationship between the tightness of the constraint in recessions and the magnitude of the compositional shifts is non-monotonic, as the di¤erence in the cyclicality of unemployment rates between the two types is highest at intermediate levels of the cash ‡ow constraint. Therefore, testing the implications of this model extension with macro/time-series data on …rm-level …nancial constraints may be challenging.
Discussion
The important insight of this last model extension is that in the baseline model outlined in Section 3, each worker-…rm match produces negative cash ‡ows at the e¢ cient reservation productivity level. As shown in the Model Appendix C2, the …rm's cash ‡ows at the reservation productivity level R i (z) can be written as:
This says that cash ‡ows at the reservation productivity level R i (z) are equal to minus the expected future discounted match surpluses S i (times the bargainig share of the …rm). Therefore, as long as the …rm receives a positive share of the surplus (i.e. 1 > 0), cash ‡ows are negative at R i (z). This can also be seen in Figure 5 , which plots cash ‡ows by matchspeci…c productivity. Importantly, cash ‡ows are more negative at the reservation match productivity level for high-ability workers than for low-ability workers for two reasons: First, because high-ability workers face lower replacement rates, the reservation match productivity R i (z) is lower and thus cash ‡ows are more negative at R i (z). Second, match surpluses at a given level of x and z are increasing in ability, which implies that at R i (z), cash ‡ows are more negative for high ability workers even if R i (z) is the same for both types. For both of these reasons, separations of high-ability workers are more sensitive to a tightening of credit. One potential concern may be that, in the model, …rms are small in the sense that they only have one employee. It may be argued that if …rms had more than one worker, the above mechanism would produce di¤erent results because the cash- ‡ow constraint would be operating at the …rm and not at the match level. In particular, high-ability workers generate a higher surplus for the …rm (because of high expected future productivity) and thus, the …rm might prefer to lay o¤ low-ability workers in order to keep its high-ability workers. Notice, however, that in a multi-worker …rm, each worker-…rm relationship has a shadow value of relaxing the cash- ‡ow constraint. This shadow value is increasing more than proportionally with the ability of the worker, because high-ability workers have lower replacement rates and thus, in the unconstrained model, the reservation match productivity is set to a lower level where cash ‡ows are more negative relative to productivity. To put it more simply, if a high-ability worker is twice as productive on average than the low-ability type (i.e., a h = 2a l ), then current cash ‡ows are more than twice as a negative at the reservation match productivity level, and thus the multi-worker …rm prefers to …re the highability worker when the cash- ‡ow constraint becomes binding. In addition, if there are small …xed …ring costs per worker, then the …rm would prefer getting rid o¤ the high-ability worker, even if cash ‡ows were fully proportional to ability. For these reasons, one should expect that -for reasonable assumptions regarding the substitutability between the two types of workers -the main mechanisms in my model to be operative in a multi-worker …rm setup.
Ideally, one should set up a multi-worker …rm model to investigate the quantitative e¤ects of cash- ‡ow constraints on the cyclicality of separations for low-and high-ability workers. However, such a model is very complicated as the wage bargained by one worker a¤ects the …rm-level cash- ‡ow constraint and thus, the wage bargained by other workers. Stole and Zwiebel's (1996) intra…rm bargaining game would be a good starting point, but is further complicated by the presence of low-and high-ability types. This important work is left for future research.
Conclusion
This paper provides new facts about the composition of the unemployment pool over the U.S. business cycle. In recessions, the pool of unemployed shifts towards workers with high wages in their previous job. Moreover, this change is driven by the higher cyclicality of separations for high-wage workers. These empirical patterns are di¢ cult to explain with a standard search-matching model with endogenous separations and worker heterogeneity, since it predicts shifts in the pool of unemployed in the opposite direction of the data.
I o¤er two extensions of the model that work better at replicating these new facts. The …rst extension introduces …rm death shocks, which a¤ect all workers indiscriminately of type. However, these shocks cannot fully account for the more cyclical separations of high-ability workers because, with such death shocks, di¤erences in the cyclicality of separation rates between low-wage and high-wage individuals are limited by di¤erences in the average separation rates between the two groups. The second extension with credit-constraint shocks, on the other hand, can fully match the di¤erences in the cyclicality of separations between low-and high-ability workers. It is somewhat di¢ cult to exactly pin down the magnitude of these credit-constraint shocks, but my simulations show that the separations of high-ability workers are more cyclical for a broad range of parameter values.
Shifts towards high-ability workers among the unemployed in slumps have important implications for models of aggregate ‡uctuations of the labor market: if ability is not perfectly observed to potential employers, these shifts pose an additional challenge to the recent literature on the "unemployment volatility puzzle" (see Shimer, 2005) . More precisely, these compositional changes aggravate the apparent lack of an ampli…cation mechanism in the standard search-matching model, as they dampen the response of the …rms'recruiting behavior to aggregate productivity shocks. Moreover, the shifts may have a large impact on the welfare costs of business cycles as high-ability workers are better able to self-insure against unemployment shocks (see, e.g., Mukoyama and Sahin, 2006) . To conduct a proper welfare analysis, however, I have to model the savings and consumption choices of the employed and unemployed. I leave this important task to future research.
Another avenue for future research is to extend my empirical analysis with other data sources. Matched employer-employee data is particularly promising as it allows us to determine the importance of …rm death for separations. Moreover, it makes it possible to extract individual …xed e¤ects from the wage and perform the same type of analysis with the average individual e¤ect instead of the average previous wage. It will also be interesting to extend my empirical analysis to other countries. Many European countries have an extensive employment protection legislation, which may a¤ect the sign as well as the magnitude of the shifts in the unemployment pool. E.g., seniority rules make it harder for …rms to lay o¤ more experienced workers. But it is unclear how these rules interact with the business cycle, as they may be circumvented or inapplicable in recessions (e.g., because of …rm and plant death). 26 Finally, matched employer-employee data could also be used to test for the importance of credit frictions for the compositional changes in the pool of unemployed, if balance sheet information on the …rm side is obtained. 26 Forslund et al. (2011) provide some evidence for Sweden that suggests similar patterns as in the U.S.
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In part of the analysis in Section 2, I use wage residuals. The regression I run to create these residuals, is the log hourly wage on potential expericence (quadratic polynomial), educational attainment, gender, marital status, an interaction term between marital status and gender, dummies for black, hispanic and other race and dummies for each state, year, occupation and industry. Potential experience is de…ned as age minus years of school and minus 6. In order to take into account for changes in the coe¢ cients of the regression over time, I run the regression for each year in a rolling window (i.e., including data from plus and minus …ve years) and then compute the residual for that year. Let's divide the pool of employed in two equally large group, i.e., into those below and above the median. The share of unemployed and the share of employed of group i then can be written as:
where i stands for low or high, and where i is the population share of group i. The changes in the shares then can be written as
and where the latter can be approximated as
and using the averages and the cyclicality of unemployment by wage group from 
C1. A Search-Matching Model with Non-Directed Search
If search on the …rm side is non-directed to a particular worker type, then there is only one aggregate matching function:
Note that in this model, there is an important interaction between the labor markets of low-and high-ability types, as the composition of the pool of unemployed is of importance for the …rm's chances of meeting the high-ability types and thus a¤ects the incentives for posting vacancies.
The value functions of the worker are the same as before:
whereas the value functions of the …rm are now:
where the imporant di¤erence is that the value of the vacancy is now independent of type, as …rms post vacancies for all types of workers. This implies that the value of posting a vacancy depends on the share of the low-ability types in the pool of unemployed ( ). A non-directed search equilibrium is de…ned as R i (Z), w i (Z; x), (Z) and the value functions U i (Z),W i (Z; x),V (Z) and J i (Z; x) that satisfy: 1. the Nash-bargaining solution (11), 2. the e¢ cient-separation equation (12), 3. the zero-pro…t condition: V (Z) = 0 and 4. the value functions (22) , (23), (24) and (25) .
Note that in the non-directed search equilibrium, the group-speci…c unemployment rates and the distribution of types across match productivities are aggregate state variables. The reason is that the …rms' decision to post a vacancy depends on the share of low types in the pool of unemployed in the current as well as in future periods. The distribution of worker types across match productivties x is needed to forecast the share of low types in the future, because the more workers of one type are close to the productivity threshold where separations occur, the more likely this share is to increase for that group in the future. This complicates the analysis considerably as it is generally not possible to solve a model with a highly dimensional state space such as with the distribution of worker types across match productivties. For this reason, I only do the comparative statitics for the non-directed search model because in the steady state, the distribution of worker types is constant across time. I leave it to future work to compute an approximate equilibrium with a limited set of aggregate state variables similar to Krusell and Smith's (1998) method in models with heterogeneity in asset holdings. Appendix Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 show the comparative statics results for the directed and non-directed search model. The results between the two models are similar; in particular, the di¤erences in the cyclicality of separations between the low-and high-ability types are not a¤ected to any considerable extent by the modeling choices on non-directed or directed search.
C2. A Search-Matching Model with Cash-Flow Constraints
This appendix provides formal propositions and proofs of the intuition explained in the text.
Proposition 1 At the e¢ cient reservation match productivity R i (z), the …rm's cash ‡ows are negative if the …rm's bargaining share is larger than 0.
Proof. At R i (z), the joint surplus of the match is zero, as well as the surplus share of the …rm. Because of the zero-pro…t condition, we get:
and thus
which says that cash ‡ows have to be negative at the e¢ cient reservation match productivity level if the …rm expects a surplus from the match in the future, i.e., if the …rm's surplus share is positive (1 > 0). This holds for any process of match productivity with some positive probability of a higher match productivity in future periods.
Proposition 2 At the e¢ cient reservation match productivity R i (z), wages do not adjust in response to a credit-constraint shock, and matches separate if the constraint is binding.
Proof. At the e¢ cient reservation match productivity, the total match surplus as well as the worker share of the surplus is zero. Therefore, the worker is not willing to take a wage cut, because it would result in a negative surplus share for the worker.
Proposition 3 If b i = ba i and f ( i ) = f , then, at the e¢ cient reservation match productivity R i (z), cash ‡ows are more negative for high-ability workers.
Proof. From the proposition above, we know that the cash ‡ow at the reservation match productivity level depends on the discounted future expected surplus. So if the expected surplus is higher for high-ability workers, then cash ‡ows are more negative at R i (z). If b i = ba i , then the surplus can be written as:
and if
whereS(z; x) 0 is independent of ability. This implies that the surplus is increasing proportionally to ability and thus cash ‡ows at R i (z) are more negative for high-ability workers.
It follows that if
= 0, cash ‡ows at the reservation match productivity level are even more negative for high-ability workers, since the surplus is even higher for high-ability workers. Note that the assumption that the job-…nding rates are the same for the two groups is not necessarily met: the model calibration targets the average job-…nding rate to be 0.3 for both groups, but the job-…nding rates are allowed to di¤er over the cycle.
Appendix Tables   low  high  low Notes: Newey-West corrected standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All series are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 900,000 (unless otherwise stated). T he cylicality is measured as the coefficient β in the regression log(xit) = α+βlog(Ut)+εit, where xit is the separation, job-finding or unemployment rate of group i at time t and Ut is the sample unemployment rate. Notes: Newey-West corrected standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All series are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 900,000 (unless otherwise stated). T he cylicality is measured as the coefficient β in the regression log(xit) = α+βlog(Ut)+εit, where xit is the separation, job-finding or unemployment rate of group i at time t and Ut is the sample unemployment rate. Similar to Bils, Chang and Kim (2009), I instrument the sample unemployment rate with the official unemployment rate because of measurement error. Sample size: 322 monthly observations. Source: T he author's estimates with data from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group and CPS monthly files for the years 1979-2008.
Adjusted for time aggregation bias
Filtering: HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 14400
Filtering: Not filtered, but controlling for linear trend Notes: Newey-West corrected standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All series are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 900,000 (unless otherwise stated). T he cylicality is measured as the coefficient β in the regression log(xit) = α+βlog(Ut)+εit, where xit is the separation, job-finding or unemployment rate of group i at time t and Ut is the sample unemployment rate. Similar to Bils, Chang and Kim (2009), I instrument the sample unemployment rate with the official unemployment rate because of measurement error. Sample size: 322 monthly observations. Source: T he author's estimates with data from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group and CPS monthly files for the years 1979-2008.
Filtering: Not filtered, but controlling for linear trend Notes: Newey-West corrected standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All series are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 900,000. T he cylicality is measured as the coefficient β in the regression log(xit) = α+βlog(Ut)+εit, where xit is the separation, hiring or unemployment rate of group i at time t and Ut is the sample unemployment rate. Similar to Bils, Chang and Kim (2009), I instrument the sample unemployment rate with the official unemployment rate because of measurement error. Sample size: 322 monthly observations. Source: T he author's estimates with data from the CPS Outgoing Rotation Group and CPS monthly files for the years 1979-2008. 
